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RICHARD L. HASEN*
INTRODUCTION
It is a tired cliché that Washington is “broken” and needs fixing. A 2011
Gallup poll found that 64% of voters had low or very low trust in Members of
Congress, the lowest percentage ever recorded by Gallup for a profession, a rating
tied with lobbyists and below trust ratings for telemarketers and car salespeople.1
The recent economic downturn has coincided not only with record low approval
ratings for Congress2 and general lack of trust in government.3 It also produced
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two protest movements, the Tea Party on the right and the Occupy movement on
the left.4 Despite the fact that these movements come from the fringes of the
Republican and Democratic parties, they share some common critiques of federal
lawmaking: they condemn the role of lobbyists in Washington and the “crony
capitalists” who hire them. From President Obama to Senator Rand Paul and
Sarah Palin, there is widespread sentiment that money in Washington skews
political outcomes, and that lobbyists are the fixers who cut the deals which help
insiders benefit themselves against the public interest.5
In their new, and very different, books, Harvard professor Lawrence
Lessig from the left and disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff from the right come to
similar conclusions about what is wrong with Washington. Lessig’s book is a
populist call to action for the people to “take back Washington” through campaign
finance reform. Abramoff’s book is an autobiography which is part apology and
part justification for a promising career which veered badly off track.
Despite the different starting points, the books end in much the same
place. Lessig and Abramoff both want to take lobbyists out of the fundraising
business, breaking the connection between money and lobbyists’ legitimate
information-providing function. They seek to close the revolving door between
Congress and lobbying shops because of the inherent conflict arising when
officeholders or staffers start thinking about post-government lobbying jobs. They
part company on what else is needed: Lessig wants publicly-financed campaign
finance vouchers to further lessen the power of special interests while Abramoff
wants to shrink the size of government to give lobbyists a smaller target.
Together, Lessig and Abramoff offer a mostly convincing critique of how
lobbying skews public policy and can harm the United States. The books
demonstrate that lobbying can thwart the public interest, especially when players
with much at stake use lobbyists to block or alter legislation on issues which lack
salience with the general public. Although it is tempting to focus on Abramoff’s
admittedly illegal behavior, both books illustrate that much of the problem of
money, politics, and lobbying stems from what is legal, not illegal. Indeed,
although both Abramoff and Lessig present the problem as one of “corruption,”
the real concern is less with exchanges of dollars for political favors and more
with the decline in national economic welfare which occurs thanks to lobbyistfacilitated rent-seeking.6 Lessig also appears concerned with political inequality,
although he distances himself from egalitarian arguments for reform. Defining the
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See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 19394 (2012) (discussing criticisms from left and right of lobbyists and the role of campaign
contributions in Washington politics).
6
See id.; infra Part III.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017026

FIXING WASHINGTON (REVIEW ESSAY)

3

problem as one other than quid pro quo corruption, however, threatens the
constitutionality of reforms in a post-Citizens United world.7
While the critiques of the Washington status quo are well made, both
books offer incomplete reform agendas and an unconvincing path to enacting
reform. Much of what is wrong with Washington has nothing to do with money in
politics. Instead partisan gridlock and the divergence of legislative action from the
apparent public interest emerges from the highly partisan and ideological nature
of Congress and the presidency; polarized views on the nature of the public
interest; the breakdown of civility and an era of “gotcha” politics; and structural
impediments to enacting legislation, such as the Senate filibuster and changes in
the House committee structure.8
The current trend of toxic politics and inadequate institutions to channel
such politics arose not from an outsized influence of money on politics but from a
variety of sources, including the party realignment in the South following the civil
rights movement and the resurgence of partisan media (and now social media).
Even if the authors’ complete reform agendas were enacted and the amount of
rent-seeking legislation procured by lobbying significantly curbed, it is far from
clear that Washington would be “fixed.” Lessig, for example, claims that money
has prevented both left and right from getting their agendas passed. It is hard to
see that money has been the primary stumbling block to enacting simultaneously
competing agendas. When it comes to the high salience, big legislative questions
such as immigration reform, the primary barriers to reform are partisanship,
deadlock, and vetogates,9 not the role of money. In the rare circumstance when
major legislative reform does pass, as in the case of health care reform, the
passage of legislation further fuels partisan recriminations.
Nor is it clear that the kinds of fundamental campaign finance reforms
which Lessig advocates stand any realistic chance of being enacted under current
political conditions. Lessig acknowledges the hard road ahead, but even so he still
seems overly optimistic. For example he suggests there is a ten percent chance
that a call for a constitutional convention to amend the Constitution to allow new
campaign finance and lobbying reform could succeed. But the same partisan,
sclerotic politics which would make reform of money in politics only a partial
solution to broken Washington would also make the chances of calling a
constitutional convention to enact a reform agenda much slimmer than one-in-ten.
Fixing Washington’s money problems may have to await widespread scandal, and
7
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fixing its broader problems likely will have to await a societal shift which
alleviates the partisanship currently gripping national politics.10
Part I of this Review Essay describes each author’s motivation to focus on
the role of money in politics, their views on how money affects politics, and their
reform proposals. Part II considers whether the authors have accurately described
the influence of money on politics. Finally, Part III examines the whether each
author’s core reform proposals are constitutional, whether the reforms could be
enacted in the current partisan atmosphere, and whether the reforms, if enacted,
would “fix” Washington.11 There are doubts on all three fronts.
I.

THE CLAIMS
Motivations: Money is the root of all evil. Unlike those academics who
write regularly about the intersection of money and politics. Professor Lawrence
Lessig, a leader in the fields of intellectual property and Internet law, came to the
issue in a roundabout way. “I was driven to this shift when I became convinced
that the questions I was addressing in the fields of copyright and Internet policy
depended upon resolving the policy questions—the corruption—that I address
here.” (Lessig, p. xiii.) Indeed, at the beginning of the book Lessig endorses
television commentator Cenk Uygur’s statement that “[t]here is only one issue in
this country….[c]ampaign finance reform.” (Lessig, p. xi.) “[P]ractically every
important issue in American politics is tied to this ‘one issue in this country.’”
(Lessig, p. xi.)
Lessig, now a liberal but formerly a young Reagan delegate at the 1980
Republican national convention (Lessig, p. 7), sees the campaign money issue as
politically transcendent, with appeal to the left and right. (Lessig, pp. xi, 7.) He
recounts speaking recently at the National Tea Party convention, and notes that
although they differed on many issues, such as gay marriage, “we were united in
the view that this republic can do better.” (Lessig, p. 325.) According to Lessig,
“[c]hange on the Left gets stopped because strong, powerful private interests use
their leverage to block changes to the status quo. Change on the Right gets
stopped because strong powerful public interests, Congress, work to block any
change that would weaken their fund-raising machine.” The current system of
campaign funding “radically benefits the status quo—the status quo for private
interests and the status quo of the Fund-raising Congress.” (Lessig, pp. 211-12.)
While Lessig’s book is written as a call to action, Jack Abramoff’s book is
a personal autobiography which offers an insider’s view into the Washington
10
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world of money and power. Abramoff too grew up a Reagan Republican,
beginning his activism during the period of the Reagan Administration in the
College Republicans with compatriots Grover Norquist (now of the powerful
Americans for Tax Reform) and former Christian Coalition executive Ralph
Reed.
When Republicans took over control of Congress in 1994, Republican
lobbyists were suddenly in demand and Abramoff began the arc of a career which
at one point made him one of the most powerful lobbyists in Washington, with the
ability to manipulate congressional legislation and action. He succeeded in getting
Representative Bob Ney twice to submit remarks in the Congressional record
criticizing an offshore company which Abramoff was negotiating to buy to
influence the sale. (Abramoff, p. 205.) (Ney later went to prison because of
Abramoff-related improprieties.12) Abramoff’s spectacular lobbying career
flamed out with a plea bargain deal landing him in federal prison for conspiracy,
mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax evasion.
Abramoff now is out of prison, and he is presenting himself to the public
as a reformer,13 giving seminars on ethics,14 speaking to the good government
group Public Citizen15 and at Lessig’s ethics center,16 and blogging about reform
matters.17 He does take some responsibility for his actions in his book, admitting
he did wrong and acted illegally.18 (Abramoff, p.277) But he is not harsh enough

12

Fox News, Former Rep. Bob Ney Released from Prison, Feb. 20, 2008,
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Fixed? The Ultimate Insider Shows Us Why the System’s Broken, and How to Reform It.” (Last
visited July 6, 2012).
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Julie Bykowicz, Abramoff as Ethics Guru Latest Chapter in Political Second Acts, Bloomberg
News, Jan. 12, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-03/abramoff-as-ethics-gurulatest-chapter-in-political-second-acts.html.
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Dana Milbank, Jack Abramoff’s Atonement, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jack-abramoffsatonement/2012/02/06/gIQA6oA5uQ_story.html?hpid=z4.
16
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School,
Dec.
9,
2011,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2011/12/09_jack_abramoff_talks_about_corruption.html.
17
Rick Hasen, Strange Bedfellows Dept., Election Law Blog, Feb. 4, 2012,
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=29239.
18
His fullest mea culpa is the following: “I was the cause of my difficulties. Regardless of my
rationalizations, I was the one who didn’t disclose to my clients that there was a conflict of interest
in the arrangement I had with my partner to split the profits from the programs they funded. I was
the one who lavished contributions, meals, event tickets, travel, golf and jobs on innumerable
federal public officials with the expectation or understanding they would take official actions on
my behalf or on behalf of my clients. I was the one who diverted income from those activities to
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on himself, suggesting at one point that although he violated federal criminal
statutes, he did so unwittingly because under federal law “one’s intentions do not
matter.”19 “I wasn’t the devil that the media were so quick to create, but neither
was I the saint I always hoped to become. I was somewhere in the middle, but no
where near where I wanted to be.” (Abramoff, p. 277.) One of his greatest faults,
he explains in a bit of false modesty, was that he was giving away too much
money to charity while he was raking in funds from competing Indian tribes, and
taking money on the side for his consulting work with business partner Mike
Scanlon in an arrangement he did not disclose to his clients. (Abramoff, pp. 166,
193.)20
For Abramoff, as for Lessig, money is at the root of all evil in
Washington, leading to what Abramoff characterizes as legalized bribery.
(Abramoff, p. 90.) He claims to have spent $1.5 million a year on sports tickets to
use for members of Congress and their staffs (Abramoff, p. 163), describes
lucrative golf trips, junkets, meals and other goodies given to Congress and staff,
and he recounts what—if accurate—could be described only as a brash

non-profits and other entities thereby evading federal income taxes. These activities added to the
corruption which engulfs our nation’s capital, and I’m not proud of it.” (Abramoff, p. 277.)
19
“Eventually it became clear that I was not as blameless as I first thought. I had broken the law.
I might not have intended to do so, but as I came to understand, under federal criminal law,
intentions didn’t matter.” (Abramoff, p. 234.)
20
At many points in the book, Abramoff describes himself in the best possible light. He
downplays his business prowess in explaining his questionable SunCruz dealings with Adam
Kidan (Abramoff, pp. 138.) He further says that “it never occurred to us” that his use of a
nonprofit organization to launder funds from Indian tribes to him and Scanlon was illegal.
(Abramoff, p. 190). He even hedges on the main charge of self-dealing with the tribes: “I
neglected to tell my clients how much I was profiting from these grassroots efforts. I reasoned that
the tribes and clients were happy with their victories, that our efforts were priced in accordance
with their value, and that they were paying us what they agreed to pay us to stop threats they
identified to us, after proper fee negotiations. Plus, I wasn’t even keeping the money I made
anyway. I was giving upwards of 80 percent of my income for good causes and to help people.
What could possibly be wrong with any of this? Sure, I didn’t tell all my clients that I was sharing
in the profits from Mike’s operation, but did I really need to? Wasn’t it obvious? Did they think I
was doing all this extra work—work that had nothing to do with D.C. lobbying—for free? Sure
some of them knew. Others must have figured it out. Did I need to be more explicit here? Yes, I
did.” (Abramoff, p. 193.)
Abramoff also lacks self-awareness about the nature of influence and access. He tells the
story of Sugar Ray Leonard making a call to help get Abramoff admitted as an undergraduate
student into Brandeis University. (Abramoff, pp. 7-8.) He expresses gratitude for the help but
does not pause to consider whether using personal connections to get ahead is wrong. Similarly,
Abramoff describes without shame how he lobbied a Georgetown law professor to get into an
Entertainment Law class, including through offers to his professor to meet the nation’s leading
conservatives, go to the opera, and obtain dining privileges in West Wing of White House.
(Abramoff, pp.44-45.)
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shakedown of Microsoft by former House Majority leader Tom DeLay, a close
Abramoff ally.21
At this point, a caveat is in order. There is no way to verify many of the
facts in the book such as the DeLay-Microsoft exchange, and there are reasons to
doubt the veracity and accuracy of the book. Perhaps there is no better illustration
of Abramoff’s lack of credibility than a passage in his book discussing offensive
email exchanges which came to light during the criminal investigation. In those
emails, many of which were between Abramoff and Scanlon, Abramoff described
some of his Native American tribe clients by epithets including “monkeys,”
“morons,” “f’ing idiots,” and “f’ing troglodytes.”22 Abramoff’s explanation for
writing these emails defies credulity. He explains that he “was using reverse
psychology” on Scanlon to get him to continue doing work for the tribes when
Scanlon was reluctant to do so. Abramoff said he decided to “use inappropriate
language to show my angst was as great, if not greater than his…” (Abramoff, p.
213.) Not only is the explanation inherently incredible; it is also at odds with the
more credible explanation Abramoff offered to an NPR interviewer in 2011: “I
wrote into my emails dumb, stupid things; jocular, idiotic thoughts.”23
The book also suffers from inaccuracies. For example, Abramoff explains
how he was trying to get language favorable to his client inserted into an
21

Abramoff recounts a story of DeLay’s interaction with a Microsoft executive who had declined
to make a campaign contribution supporting Republicans:
One of the Microsoft executives firmly brushed off his solicitation, prompting DeLay to
deliver a stern message. When he was a freshman in Congress, he approached Walmart
for a campaign contribution. The government affairs director of Walmart told him that
Walmart didn’t like to ‘sully their hands’ with political involvement. Staring intently at
the Microsoft executive, DeLay continued: ‘A year later, the government affairs rep was
in my office asking me to intervene to get an exit built from the federal highway adjacent
to a new Walmart store. I told him I didn’t want to sully my hands with such a task. You
know what? They didn’t get their ramp. You know what else? They will never get that
ramp.’ DeLay smiled, without taking his eyes off the quivering executives. [¶] As we
would often say in the lobbying business: they finally got the joke. A $100,000 check
was soon delivered to the Republican Congressional Committee, and Microsoft’s
relationship with the American right commenced.
(Abramoff, p. 65.)
22
The emails themselves appear in an appendix to a 2004 committee hearing by the Senate
Committee
on
Indian
Affairs
which
may
be
accessed
at:
http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-ID=HRG-2004-IAS-0035. See also
Robert Moore, Special Report: Jack Abramoff’s Private Emails Disparaged Tiguas, EL PASO
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011.
23
National Public Radio, Jack Abramoff Calls D.C. Politics as Dirty as Ever, Tell Me More, Nov.
18, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/11/18/142506539/jack-abramoff-calls-d-c-politics-dirty-asever.
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unrelated election reform bill, the Help America Vote Act. He says that reform
bills were the best vehicles for slipping in helpful language, because they could
easily pass out of a partisan Congress.24 HAVA, he explains, was simply “a noncontroversial reform bill” (Abramoff, p. 206.) In fact, Democrats and Republicans
battled mightily over HAVA, with Republicans wanting the bill to contain antifraud and voter identification measures and Democrats wanting the bill to contain
measures making it easier for people to vote. It almost did not pass.25
Despite these serious concerns about aspects of the book and the danger
that Abramoff offered false or exaggerated descriptions to boost his post-prison
standing, it is worth close examination, both because of its description of the
various ways in which lobbyists may attempt to buy influence in Washington and
to consider Abramoff’s views on potential ways to diminish such influence.
Mechanisms: Money, Reciprocity, and Influence. Lessig and Abramoff
present a picture of Washington in which lobbyists act as a hub for the exchange
of influence and favor between Congress and those willing to pay for influence.
Lobbyists secure their influence by acting as campaign fundraisers, doling out
favors (such as gifts and food) in a culture of reciprocal exchange, and trading on
their personal relationships, something made especially easy by lobbyists who
went through the revolving door from Congress to K Street (the traditional home
of Washington lobbying firms). Influence is easiest to wield “on the margin”
(Lessig, p. 121), where the public is paying the least attention and lobbyists’ push
for changes in line with their clients’ interests is least likely to generate attention
and opposition.26 It is a “gift exchange” economy, where “[e]ach side subsidizes
the work of the other (lobbyists by securing funds to members: members by
securing significant benefits to the clients of the lobbyists).” (Lessig, p. 235.)
Abramoff describes the heavy lobbying work he did for the
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (Abramoff, p. 66) and later for
various Native American tribes (Abramoff, p. 87). The work for CNMI, an
American protectorate, consisted mainly of insuring that U.S. labor protections
were not extended to the area, which would have undermined its competitive
advantage in the garment industry and in other industries as a source of cheap
labor. Much of Abramoff’s work for the Native American tribes involved actions

24

“For years, it has been difficult to pass legislation in the charged partisan congressional
atmosphere. So a lobbyist trying to enact his client’s wishes needs to get his amendment onto a
bill likely to pass both the House and the Senate, and be signed by the president. No bill is more
likely to pass than a reform bill.” (Abramoff, p. 205.)
25
Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3 ELECTION L.J. 424 (2004).
26
“We worked on arcane issues relating to where a shipping vessel could be based, what routes it
could take, and other mind-numbing conundrums….One of the most vital things a lobbyist can do
when working on an issue is to ignite the passion of congressmen and their staff.” (Abramoff, p.
63.)
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to secure gaming rights for the tribes, or block or delay the gaming proposals of
competitors.27
Abramoff explains how he took “scores of Congressman and staff” to
CNMI to educate them about the issues. “Of course, these trips are not all hard
work. The Marianas are exotic and beautiful, not to mention equipped with golf,
the favorite pastime of Congressman and lobbying alike.” (Abramoff, p. 78.) “To
most lobbyists, a game of golf is just another day at the office.” (Abramoff, p. 78.)
Securing influence on these issues and others required “all manners of
perquisites, sponsored by my clients and administered by my staff and me. Golf,
elaborate meals, tickets to sporting events—any favor a representative or staff
needed, we were there to provide. Why? To create a relationship that would get
our clients’ messages to decision makers quickly.” (Abramoff, p. 90.) Some of
this behavior was illegal already (though the ethics laws were not well enforced
when Abramoff acted28); some of Abramoff’s activities were made illegal through
federal reform legislation which followed the lobbying scandal.
Abramoff also explains the payoffs to both sides from lobbying-induced
reciprocity: “DeLay’s tenacity in removing the gaming tax saved the tribes tens of
billions of dollars over the years. As a lobbyist, I thought it only natural and right
that my clients should reward those members who saved them such substantial
sums with generous contributions.” (Abramoff, p. 90.)
Access is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to legislative influence,
and so the game is finding paths to Members of Congress, Senators, and their
staff: “Of course, having the best arguments and presentations is essential, but
arguments not heard by anyone are irrelevant. Many times lobbyists had better
arguments than we did. Our clients were not perfect, after all. But since it was we
who had the meetings with the decisionmakers, and not they, we won. We had
access, the second key to winning lobbying. How did we get the access? By hiring
people who already had access of their own.” (Abramoff p. 92.)
The best way to secure access is by hiring “Capitol Hill staff who were
well connected and who could play hardball when needed….The Congressional
staff were the only ones who really got things done.” (Abramoff, p. 93.) Abramoff
describes the particularly insidious nature of the lobbyist revolving door:
Once I found a congressional office that was vital to our clients—usually
because they were incredibly helpful and supportive—I would often
27

“It is always easier to stop a bill than to put one through.” (Abramoff, p. 197.)
“We spent our days looking or loopholes, and when we couldn’t find one, we just did what we
had to do anyway. The rules were not being enforced, certainly not against the lobbyists.”
(Abramoff, p. 91; see also p. 205, discussing his “Signatures” restaurant: “Flaunting the by-now
much trampled gift-ban rules, I became a virtual cafeteria for large groups of representatives and
staff.”)
28
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become close to the chief of staff of the office. In almost every
congressional office, the chief of staff is the center of power. …After a
number of meetings with them, possibly including meals or rounds of golf,
I would say a few magic words: “When you are done working for the
Congressman, you should come work for me at my firm.” With that,
assuming the staffer had any interest in leaving Capitol Hill for K street—
and almost 90 percent of them do, I would own him and, consequently,
that entire office.…No one even knew what was happening, but suddenly,
every move that staffer made, he made with his future at my firm in
mind.”
(Abramoff, p. 95.)
Reform Proposals. Both Abramoff and Lessig spend much more time in
their books discussing the problems with Washington than defending their reform
proposals. But both suggest wide-ranging, and in some senses radical, changes to
affect the relationship among money, politics and influence.
Both authors advocate that we take lobbyists out of the business of
fundraising and close the revolving door between Congress and K Street. Lessig
endorses the proposal of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on
Lobbying29 and of former Bush ethics czar Richard Painter30 to take lobbyists out
of the fundraising business. (Lessig, pp. 118-19.) “[I]f lobbyists weren’t able to
channel funds to campaigns, and hence, if congressmen didn’t depend upon
lobbyists to get them the resources they need to run, then the value of lobbying
services would decline.”
Abramoff agrees that “we need to entirely eliminate any contribution by
those lobbying the government, participating in a federal contract, or otherwise
financially benefitting from public funds.”31 “If you choose to lobby, if you
choose to take money from our nation, if you choose to perform federal contracts,
or if you draw your compensation from any entity which does, you need to
29

TASK FORCE ON FED. LOBBYING LAWS, ABA, LOBBYING LAW IN THE SPOTLIGHT: CHALLENGES
AND
PROPOSED
IMPROVEMENTS
20
(2011)
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/administrative_law/lobbying_t
ask_force_report_010311.authcheckdam.pdf. As a matter of disclosure, I was a member of this
task force.
30
RICHARD W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM
CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 257 (2009) (“It is, however, meaningless to criminalize buying a fiftydollar lunch or cigarbox for a lawmaker, yet allow a lobbyist to raise $50,000 in campaign
contributions for the same lawmaker and invite clients to meet the lawmaker. Prohibiting the
former may even be a smokescreen for ignoring the latter.”).
31
It is not clear if Abramoff literally means to bar contributions from anyone who benefits
financially from public funds. If so, this would seem to cut off a large segment of the U.S.
population from the ability to make campaign contributions.

FIXING WASHINGTON (REVIEW ESSAY)

11

abstain from giving campaign contributions.” “Not only should lobbyists be
banned from contributing to officials’ organizations and campaign funds, they
should be banned from gift-giving as well….No finger food, no snacks, no hot
dogs…Remove all temptations.” (Abramoff, p. 273.)
Lessig hopes that the declining power of lobbyists which would come
from taking them out of the fundraising business would dry up lobbying firms’
abilities to pay large salaries to former Members. (Lessig, p. 218.) Abramoff
would solve the revolving door problem more directly: “[T]he lure of post-public
service needs to be eliminated…. If you choose to serve Congress or on a
congressional staff, you should be barred for life from working for any company,
organization, or association which lobbies the federal government. That may seem
harsh—and it is.” (Abramoff, p. 273.)32 He would also prevent former Members
from avoiding the lobbying ban by becoming “consultants.” He would have them
get out of Washington and get a “real job.” (Abramoff, p. 274.)
Beyond agreement on lobbyist fundraising bans and closing the revolving
door, Abramoff and Lessig part company on reform proposals, with Abramoff
tacking right and Lessig going left. Abramoff is skeptical about eliminating
earmarks, saying that doing so makes it “much harder…legitimately controlling
inappropriate executive branch choices” and that their elimination did not stop
corruption, (Abramoff, p. 125.) Lessig in contrast paints earmarks as a major part
of the problem, seeing them as a prime way in which lobbyists get what they want
for their clients. (Lessig pp. 112-16.)33
Abramoff is ready to impose term limits on Congress to make it harder for
lobbyists to build relationships on which they can cash in (Abramoff, p. 274),
make Congress subject to the laws it passes (Abramoff, p. 275), and repeal the
Seventeenth Amendment (Abramoff, p. 275), returning to state legislatures the
power to choose United States Senators. He suggests Members of Congress
should be “barred from proposing, lobbying for, and perhaps even voting on
projects in their districts and states.” (Abramoff, p. 274-75.)
Most importantly, Abramoff wants to shrink the size of the federal
government. (Abramoff, p. 272.) “There is no way to eliminate corruption in
human endeavors, but the removal of temptation is always a good place to start.

32

This too seems quite broad. Abramoff would bar former members of Congress and staffers not
only from working as lobbyists, but working for any entity which lobbies the federal government.
This would seem to include most large private and public companies, and many government and
educational entities.
33
Earmarks are a relatively small part of the federal budget and not a major source of economic
distortion. See Hasen, supra note 5, at 235 n.257. But Lessig appears to use the term more
broadly. For example, he spends time discussing the rent-seeking associated with the misnamed
American Jobs Creation Act. (Lessig, p. 117.) It is an excellent example of rent-seeking. Hasen,
supra note 5, at 233. But it was a normal bill, not an earmark.
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In the case of the federal government, that means paring back the size and scope
of its activities.” (Abramoff, p. 272.)34
Until the government is cut down to size, Abramoff sees lobbyists as
necessary to counter government tyranny. In his short section on reform at the end
of the book, he begins with a hypothetical case involving a small business owner
who manufactures picture frames. The owner needs to hire a lobbyist to fight
against an irrational “Senator Yankee” who proposes a bill to regulate picture
frames after the Senator drops a frame on his toe. “No one in their right mind
would blame you for doing everything you could to stop the destruction of your
company. Few would think Senator Yankee was using his governmental power
properly. But the lobbyist confuses us. We resent that there is someone with a
strong connection to those with power, but without him, the picture frame factory
would most certainly be shuttered.” (Abramoff, p. 271.)
Lessig, whose political orientation is much more liberal than Abramoff’s,
moves in a very different direction. While Abramoff wants to eliminate
contribution limits to candidates entirely (except by lobbyists and federal
contractors) (Abramoff, p. 273), Lessig advocates a campaign finance voucher
system which would put money in the hands of every voter to allocate to
candidates, parties and groups.
Lessig’s proposal is similar to the proposal for vouchers which I advanced
in 199635 and which Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres advocate in their
2004 book, Voting with Dollars.36 In a bit of sloganeering reminiscent of
Ackerman and Ayres’ use of the term “Patriot dollars,” Lessig talks about the
“Grant and Lincoln project” and “democracy vouchers.” (Lessig, p. 265.) Each
voter would be given $50 to donate to congressional candidates, plus the voter
could give up to $100 of her own money to candidates. Candidates would
voluntarily opt into the program in order to be eligible to get the public financing,
and it could put $6 billion into the campaign finance system every two years.
34

On why shrinking the size of the government, even if possible, would not seriously curtail the
amount of interest group rent-seeking, see Hasen, supra note 5, at 244-49.
35
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996). Lessig notes that I made my proposal
before the Supreme Court overruled Austin and rejected its rationale. (Lessig 365-66 n.6.)
However, both my proposal and Lessig’s proposal (if it is going to work) would require either a
constitutional amendment or the Supreme Court reversing course on its First Amendment
campaign finance jurisprudence.
36
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2004). Lessig opposes the other aspect of their proposal, anonymous
campaign contributions. He says this proposal is ingenious, but it might work too well and limit
the amount of money contributed to campaigns. “The mechanics are too complex, the sources of
suspicion are too great.” (Lessig, pp. 261-63.) On the other side of the disclosure question, Lessig
says that campaign finance disclosure will do enough work. It is incomplete, though “critically
important to avoiding more grotesque forms of corruption.” (Lessig, p. 257.)
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Candidates opting in could take no other private money. (Lessig, pp. 266-68.)
The benefit of the voucher system, according to Lessig, is that “no one could
believe that money was buying results.” (Lessig, p. 268.) He says that $3 billion a
year is cheap to fix democracy and restore public confidence. (Lessig, p. 269.)
In a discussion that reveals Lessig’s (perhaps subconscious) concern with
political equality, he says that any bundling of campaign finance vouchers would
be unobjectionable: “The problem with American democracy is not that people
are trying to aggregate their influence. It is that the influence they aggregate is so
wildly disproportionate to the influence the system intended—votes.” (Lessig, p.
271.)
Lessig’s voucher proposal hinges on “one critical assumption:” that
corporate independent expenditures will not “simply evolve into another kind of
dependency.” (Lessig, p. 271.) Lessig wrote his book just before the explosion of
Super-PACs, but he clearly saw the explosion coming. He says that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC has caused massive growth of
“‘independent’ spending,”37 with the word “independent” “in quotes because
whether they are independent or, just as important, whether they are perceived to
be independent is an open question.” (Lessig, p. 271.) Legislators’ dependence on
independent spenders leads to policy distortion and undermines public trust.
(Lessig, p. 243.)
Even if the extent of independent spending growth is not yet known, in a
post-Citizens United world, rational congressional candidates likely will not opt
into voucher public financing if they know that they could face massive
independent spending against them. Further, even if candidates opt in, the amount
of independent spending could create dependency and undermine public
37

Lessig does not adequately demonstrate that Citizens United has caused a growth in independent
spending. He points to what he calls an “explosion” of independent money (p. 239), which he says
followed Citizens United. He shows a chart on independent expending with a huge leap from 2006
spending of $68 million in 2006 to a 400% increase to $304.7 million in outside spending in 2010.
He suggests the increase is due to Citizens United.
However, according to the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org) the
2008 numbers for outside money (not cited by Lessig) which preceded Citizens United, were $301
million. True 2008, and not 2006 or 2010, was a presidential election year, with higher total
spending on the election. But Lessig’s analysis on this point seems overly simplistic.
I examined Center for Responsive Politics’ data on outside spending from the last three
presidential election cycles up to March of each presidential election year, and the data strongly
suggest that since Citizens United outside spending has grown markedly. Richard L. Hasen, The
Numbers Don’t Lie: If You Aren’t sure Citizens United Gave Rise to Super PACs, Just Follow the
Money,
SLATE,
Mar.
9,
2012,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/03/the_supreme_court_s_citizens_
united_decision_has_led_to_an_explosion_of_campaign_spending_.html. A further review of the
data at the end of the 2012 election cycle will help to confirm an outside money explosion.
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confidence in the electoral process. He gives an example of an industry group
threatening to fund $1 million in ads against any Senator voting for climate
change legislation. “After Citizens United, limits on independent expenditures are
removed. And while the threats [to legislators] must still be independent, there are
many ways that corporate wealth can be translated into significant political
influence that would never be revealed by any system of disclosure alone.”
(Lessig, p. 259.)
For this reason, Lessig says that Congress should be able to limit
independent expenditures to prevent dependent corruption. As discussed below,
Lessig recognizes that this may be unconstitutional under current Supreme Court
doctrine, and “[i]t may well be that we need constitutional reform to assure
congressional independence.” (Lessig, p. 272.)
II.

THE DISEASE
How Lobbyists Affect Public Policy.38 Lessig’s and Abramoff’s
descriptions of how lobbyists achieve success gibes with the best social science
understanding of lobbying. Lobbyists use a variety of tools to achieve such
influence, including mobilizing individual citizens to contact legislators
(grassroots lobbying), testifying at hearings, submitting written comments to an
agency or committee, press releases, and other activities.39 But lobbyists’ most
important tool is personal contact with legislators and staff members.40 A lobbyist
with access to a legislator is in the best position to influence public policy. Once
a lobbyist secures access, she influences policy primarily by providing credible
information to a legislator or staffer to argue for a particular legislative action.
Lobbyists often provide support and useful information for a position a
legislator already holds.41 At other times, the issue of interest to the lobbyist (and
38

The next four paragraphs appeared in substantially similar form in Hasen, supra note 5, at 21926.
39
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES,
AND WHY 151 (2009) (chart summarizing various methods by which federal lobbyists worked to
achieve their policy goals); see also KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ch. 7 (1986) (earlier study discussing lobbying tactics
used to influence Congress); ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT
(AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) 18 (2006) (study of 34 lobbyists on federal, state, and local
level).
40
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 152; id. at 153; NOWNES, supra note 39, at 200; id. at
213-15. Citizen volunteers report using similar tools when engaging in local lobbying. BRIAN E.
ADAMS, CITIZEN LOBBYISTS: LOCAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY 134 tbl. 7.1 (2007).
41
See Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 69 (2006).
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her client) is one about which the legislator has no firm position or even
knowledge, and one about which the public is not paying any attention. In such
circumstances the legislator is often willing to help a friendly lobbyist achieve her
client’s interests, especially when the client is a constituent or has business
affecting the legislator’s district.42
Lobbyists rarely can sway resistant legislators on high-salience issues
about which the public appears to be paying a great deal of attention.43 Lobbyists
for the banking industry, for example, could not stop a bill to revamp the student
loan program once this became a priority for the Obama Administration.44 Rather
than working primarily to change legislative minds on issues of high public
salience, lobbyists, like mushrooms, thrive in areas of low light.45 But lobbyists
can win even after losing, getting bad parts of bills rewritten in committee, or in
implementing regulations.46
Money and Access. Lobbyists gain access through the cultivation of
relationships with legislators and staffers using a variety of tools permissible
under the law,47 especially the raising of campaign contributions for legislators.
Campaign contributions are key part of a culture of reciprocity.48 Feelings of
reciprocity are formed easily and without the outlay of considerable resources,49
but those who help out the most are likely to get the greatest access. It is a natural
instinct to help someone out who has helped you. In this context, why shouldn’t a
legislator help a lobbyist supporter by favoring her client’s interests on an issue
about which the legislator has no personal preference?50
42

See John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, Academic Earmarks and the Returns to
Lobbying, 49 J. L. & ECON. 597 (2006).
43
Birnbaum and Murray, for example, describe in painstaking detail how even the most highlypaid professional lobbyists were unable to derail a large corporate tax increase which became part
of the political popular Tax Reform Act of 1986, a major tax bill passed during the Reagan
Administration with bipartisan support. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN
AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF REFORM (1987).
44
Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan Program, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
30,
2010,
available
at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/us/politics/31obama.html.
45
See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 120-21.
46
Birnbaum & Murray, supra note 43, at 233-37.
47
NOWNES, supra note 39, at 17-19.
48
GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 11 (2001).
49
See Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lobbying
Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 10, 15-17
(2008) (describing experiments in which experimenters created feelings of reciprocity through the
provision of a soft drink); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are
So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 524 (2008).
50
See ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE
CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 297 (2009 (lobbyist Gerry Cassidy explains that money
is given to “reinforce established connections” and is given “because of long-term relationships

16

RICHARD L. HASEN

Lobbyists often do much more than simply contribute money themselves
to these pivotal legislators; they have become prolific fundraisers and bundlers of
campaign contributions for key legislators and party leaders.51 Another key means
of securing legislative access through the revolving door. Many prominent former
Senators and Members of Congress have become lobbyists, and dozens of former
staffers of sitting Senators and Members of Congress have done so as well.52
Indeed, half the Senators who left office between 1998 and 2004 became
lobbyists.53 A study by Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen find that lobbyists with past
working experience in the office of a United States Senator suffer an average
sharp 24% drop in revenue when that Senator leaves office.54 That is, once the
main connection to the elected official disappears, the revolving door lobbyist’s
value on the market drops.
Measuring their claims against the available social science evidence,
Lessig and Abramoff have fairly described a system in which those who want to
influence the shape of legislation (or block legislation) hire lobbyists to achieve
their goals. Lobbyists, through campaign finance activity and personal
connections, are more likely than others to be able to achieve access to Members
of Congress and their staff. Especially on low salience issues, the access can well
lead to positive legislative outcomes for the lobbyists’ clients.
Measuring the Influence of Money on Policy. Given the strength of this
empirical case, it is curious that Lessig spends a great deal his book defending his
argument for reform of money in politics against charges that good political
science does not support the view that money has great influence over the
legislative process. He argues for citizen action now “rather than sitting around

and friendships”); Larry Matkinson, What Money Buys, in SHADES OF GRAY: PERSPECTIVES ON
CAMPAIGN ETHICS 171, 181 (Candice J. Nelson, David A. Dulio & Stephen K. Medvic eds. 2002)
The ABA Task Force Report on Lobbying refers to “a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual financial
dependency.” ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 20.
51
See KAISER, supra note 33, at 80; see also id. at 105-06, 184, 272, 291. Senator Chuck Hagel
described how both Democrats and Republicans looking to raise $20 to $25 million for House and
Senate campaign committees “go to a committee of twenty-five lobbyists for a steering
committee. And you say, Okay, you guys each have to come up with a million dollars….” Id. at
291.
52
The Center for Responsive Politics offers an online database to track this “revolving door.”
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/index.php.
53
George Packer, The Empty Chamber: Just How Broken is the Senate?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 9,
2010, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/09/100809fa_fact_packer; see
also Christopher Lee, Daschle Moving to K Street, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2005, available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32604-2005Mar13.html.
54
Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, & Christain Fons-Rosen, Revolving Door Lobbyists
(unpublished
draft
dated
July
2010
and
available
at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1641217)).
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waiting for the political scientists to deliver their gold-standard proofs.” (Lessig,
p. 170.)55
But Lessig has made the case harder than it needs to be. He devotes a
number of pages to refuting Professor (and former Federal Election
Commissioner) Bradley Smith’s statement that “The evidence is pretty
overwhelming that the money does not play much of a role in what goes on in
terms of legislative voting patterns and legislative behavior”56 (Lessig, p. 125)
and to the work of Ansolabehere, de Figieiredo and Snyder showing a lack of
correlation between campaign contribution and legislative roll call votes.57
(Lessig, p. 135.)
The Ansolabehere evidence is fine so far as it goes. But as both Lessig and
Abramoff illustrate with numerous examples, roll call votes are only a small
part—and not necessarily the most important part—of the story of legislative
influence. Lobbyists help set the agenda for which legislation gets taken up and
what gets shelved; skew legislative time priorities (as Lessig nicely illustrates
with the inordinate amount of time Congress spent on debit card swipe fees,
Lessig, pp. 164-66); decide how bills are drafted and rewritten; and take informal
actions (such as pressuring executive agency regulators) short of voting on
legislation.
That there is no clear correlation between campaign contributions and roll
call votes is unsurprising, especially given the dual causal direction of
contributions: sometimes actions follow contributions, and sometimes
contributions follow actions.58 Legislators have all kinds of ways of influencing
public policy short of roll call votes, and lobbyists are adept at convincing
legislators to act in subtle ways on their clients’ behalf. As Lessig himself notes,
“influence can be exercised—and hence a campaign contribution reward—in any
stages of the potential life of a bill. If it is, it is invisible to the regressions.”
(Lessig, p. 150.) So while Smith may be right as to the lack of a connection
between money and “voting patterns,” he is surely wrong as to the connection
between money and “legislative behavior.”
In short, the problem with the studies finding little influence of money
over policy is that they take too narrow a view of legislative influence. When we
55

Here are some additional statements by Lessig about the political science evidence: “You can
support the reform of Congress without denying the power of statistical regression.” (Lessig, p.
127.) “The academic seeks a truth, but that truth is too often too obscure for citizens to grok.”
(Lessig, p. xii.)
56
Quoting Brad Smith on The Sound of Ideas, WCPN (March 29, 2011), 8:20, available at:
http://www.ideastream.org/soi/entry/39313.
57
Quoting Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figieiredo, and James M. Snyder, Why is There So
Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 105 (2003),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216842.
58
For Lessig’s broader defense, see pages 131-46.
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view legislative influence secured by lobbyists more broadly in the context of the
relationship of reciprocity, the evidence of monetary influence is quite strong.
The evidence shows a clear bias in legislative outcomes to the wellorganized who employ lobbyists. As the pathbreaking study by Frank
Baumgartner and his co-authors shows, citizen groups that engage in lobbying
have fewer resources than business groups and “are often spread thin.”59 “And
when [citizen groups] do get involved in, say, an issue relating to consumer credit
practices by banks, or an environmental dispute related to coal-mining practices,
or automobile emission standards, they often find themselves in a David and
Goliath position, with a few staff members on their side facing sometimes
hundreds of industry lobbyists or researchers who work on that one particular
issue, year-in and year-out.”60 Citizen groups use resources besides finances, such
as mobilizing voters, to attempt to fight business lobbying interests,61 but it is
often a losing battle.62
Business groups, thanks to their greater material resources (such as PAC
contributions and the lobbyists they can afford to hire), have another significant
advantage when it comes to lobbying: “Businesses are more likely to have a
friend in high places than other types of groups. [U]nions and citizen groups are
quite successful in working with rank and file but rarely get to take advantage of
the highest level of government support. Businesses enjoy much greater access
and cooperation at this level, more than twice the level of citizen groups.”63
Money, Influence, and Public Confidence. Lessig is least persuasive in his
extensive argument that the private system of campaign financing undermines
public confidence in government and the electoral process. He spends a good
early chunk of the book talking about how we infer bias when there is a situation
of a conflict of interest, for example as when medical studies funded by the
pharmaceutical industry yield different results than those which are not. (Lessig,
chapter 2.) “Money is in the wrong place.” Then, in chapter after chapter, Lessig
tells troubling stories of such conflicts, on issues ranging from carbon pollution
and copyright protection (Chapter 3) to school reform failures (blamed on
teachers’ union money) (Chapter 6) to the recent collapse of our financial system
(Chapter 7).
59

BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 11.
Id. at 11-12. see also NOWNES, supra note 29, at 208-12.
61
Id. at 12.
62
“Material resources can sometimes be trumped by sheer numbers—organizations with many
members may be heeded just as rapidly as organizations able to make large campaign
contributions.” BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 39, at 194; see also id. at 28 (“[Lobbyist-led
political mobilization is] skewed not just toward the wealthy, but more generally toward
professional communities of corporations, professionals and institutions and therefore away from
average citizens.”).
63
Id. at 202; see also id. at 209.
60
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After each chapter Lessig is very careful to say that the question is not
whether the campaign money caused policy to skew in a particular direction, only
whether it affects voters’ confidence in the fairness of the decision. (Lessig, pp.
52, 60.) (Lessig, p. 36.) He cites statistics that 75 percent of Americans believe
campaign contributions buy results in Congress. “In a line, we don’t trust our
government.” (Lessig, p. 88.)
Later in the book, however, Lessig acknowledges persuasive evidence by
Persily and Lammie showing that there is no good evidence of a correlation
between campaign finance laws and public trust.64 (Lessig, p. 270.) The public
may not trust politicians, and may well believe they are corrupted by campaign
spending, but it is a tough task to show that changing the campaign finance laws
would restore public trust. Instead, public trust is driven by more complex forces,
including voters’ views of the economic climate. The Persily/Lammie evidence
appears to strongly undercut his argument for public confidence as a reason for
reform.
But here too Lessig has made his case harder than it needs to be. As Dan
Lowenstein argued long ago, the question should not be whether certain campaign
finance and legislative activities create an appearance of corruption; instead the
relevant question is whether the activities create an actuality of a conflict of
interest.65 One can make a normative argument that legislators should not have to
make decisions when facing such conflicts without proof that the private
financing of elections causes a decline in public trust. Legislators should not face
the temptation for corruption inherent in conflicts of interest.

III.
THE CURE
Lessig and Abramoff both support taking lobbyists out of the fundraising
business. Lessig further supports the use of campaign finance vouchers,
apparently to be coupled by limits on corporate independent expenditures given
the explosion of outside money following Citizens United. Abramoff wants to ban
former Members of Congress and their staffers from ever working as lobbyists,
repeal the Seventeenth Amendment and impose term limits on Members of
Congress. In this Part, focusing on lobbyist fundraising limits and a ban
legislators’ and staffers’ future employment as lobbyists, I consider the
constitutionality of the authors’ reform proposals, the likelihood of their
64

Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When
Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004).
65
See Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 322-29 (1989).
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implementation, and the key question whether these reforms, if implemented,
would “fix” the problems of Washington.
Constitutionality. It is not clear that a ban on lobbyist contributions and
fundraising activities or a lifetime ban on lobbyist employment for former
Members of Congress and their staffers would pass constitutional muster under
current Supreme Court doctrine.66
Since the Supreme Court’s key campaign finance decision in Buckley v.
67
Valeo, the courts thus far have accepted the prevention of corruption or the
appearance of corruption as the only government interests to justify limits on
money in candidate campaigns. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court greatly
narrowed the definition of “corruption” to something close to quid pro quo
bribery, stating that the sale of “access and influence” is not corruption,68 thereby
making it harder for courts to sustain challenged campaign finance restrictions.
The Court also held that independent spending cannot corrupt or create the
appearance of corruption.69 Finally, in Buckley, Citizens United, and in other
cases, the Court rejected political equality as a permissible interest to justify
monetary limits in campaigns.70
Following Citizens United, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit struck down Connecticut’s ban on lobbyist contributions and
bundling of campaign contributions as unsupported by the government’s
anticorruption interest.71 Along similar lines, a federal district court threw out
Ohio’s anti-revolving door law for legislators-turned lobbyists on grounds that it
was not justified by an anticorruption interest.72 It remains to be seen if other
courts will go along with the reasoning of these courts.
Given the anticorruption framework established by the Supreme Court, it
is unsurprising that both Abramoff and Lessig describe the problem with
Washington lobbyists as one of “corruption.” Abramoff addresses the corruption
point only briefly in his book. After discussing the favors Tom DeLay did for
Abramoff’s Indian tribe clients and their grateful contributions made to support
DeLay in return, Abramoff declares: “What I did not consider then, and never
considered until I was sitting in prison, was that contributions from parties with an
interest in legislation are really nothing but bribes. Sure, it’s legal for the most
part. Sure, everyone in Washington does it. Sure, it’s the way the system works.
66

Hasen, supra note 5, at 235-44.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
68
See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581
(2011).
69
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 909.
70
See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 12, 13, & 14
(5th ed. 2012).
71
Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010).
72
Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
67
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It’s just one of Washington’s dirty little secrets—but it’s bribery just the same.”
(Abramoff, p. 90.) Similarly, he remarked that the “regularity with which my
staff would return from congressional offices with requests for funds, on the heels
of our asking for help should have disturbed me, but it didn’t. It was illegal and
wrong, but it didn’t register as abnormal in any way.” (Abramoff, p. 206.)
Yet much of what Abramoff describes is not criminal at all, a point he
seems to acknowledge in saying the “bribery” is “legal.” Solicitations from within
Congressional offices are illegal,73 but this is not Abramoff’s concern. He is
pointing to a system whereby Members of Congress who are lobbied by lobbyists
turn around and ask those lobbyists and their clients to assist with fundraising. So
long as we have a system of private campaign finance without limits on lobbyist
fundraising activities, such requests are going to be inevitable and, if the giving of
money is not tied to specific governmental action, it will count neither as bribes
nor as illegal gratuities.74
Lessig makes a more complex argument about corruption. He admits that
the term “corruption” ordinarily means bribery (Lessig, p. 226)—which he terms
“Type 1” corruption. Despite Abramoff’s exploits, venal bribery in this crude
form is “rare.” (Lessig, p. 8.) Lessig is more concerned with what he terms “Type
2” corruption, “dependence corruption.” “In this second sense of corruption, it is
not individuals who are corrupted within a well-functioning institution. It is
instead an institution that has been corrupted, because patterns of influence
operating upon individuals within that institution draws them away from the
influence intended.” (Lessig, p. 230.)
Notice the passive voice in Lessig’s definition: the “institution”
of government “has been corrupted”—by whom he does not say.75 It is a
“corruption” not in which lobbyists or others give legislators gifts in exchange for
official action, but one in which the system “distorts” outcomes.76 (Lessig, p.
232.)
73

See House Ethics Manual, Committee on Standards and Official Conduct, 110th Cong., 2d.
Session,
ch.
4
(2008),
http://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf.
74
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
75
“[T]he term dependence corruption describes the process of governance. It doesn’t point to a
particular tainted result.” (Lessig, p. 17 n.6.)
76
If the people are not corrupt, how is the system corrupt? Dependence corruption is
a corruption practiced by decent people, people we should respect, people working
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Although Lessig uses the term “dependence corruption,” he is writing
more about a distortion of policy outcomes, or skew, caused by the influence of
money, channeled through lobbyists, on politics. “My claim is not that campaign
cash buys any results directly.” (Lessig, p. 119.) Lessig describes “three buckets
of campaign cash: small gifts that the campaign doesn’t track, non-anonymous
“large gifts from people or interests whose interests are fairly transparent.”
“Finally the third bucket is the most important for the dynamic I am describing….
that part for which lobbyists claim credit.” (Lessig, p. 120.) Bucket three is
“where the real risk to the system thrives.” “Influence happens on the margin, and
the most powerful are the contributors who stand there” even if small relative to
other buckets “if it provided a reliable and substantial source of funds, then its
potential to distort policy would be huge.” (Lessig, p. 121.)
This idea that campaign money distorts policy outcomes (Lessig, p. 243)
sounds very much like the language used by the Supreme Court case of Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.77 There, in upholding corporate campaign
spending limits (until the reversal in Citizens United) the Court described “a
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for
the corporation’s political ideas.”78
As Chief Justice Roberts explained in his concurrence in the Citizens
United case (which overruled Austin) this argument about “a different type or
corruption” or “distortion” is really an argument about political equality: the
problem is that money skews political outcomes in an unfair way.79 Indeed,
elsewhere in his book Lessig sounds very much like he is making a political
equality argument for campaign finance reform: he is much more Occupy than
Tea Party in his populism. He explains that when money rather than voting power
conveys influence, it leads to results inconsistent with principles of democracy.
(Lessig, p. 160.)
we lose faith in its process….Participation thus declines, especially among the sensible
middle. Policy gets driven by the extremists at both ends.
(Lessig, pp. 8-9.) “Each side subsidizes the work of the other (lobbyists by securing funds to
members: members by securing significant benefits to the clients of the lobbyists). But that
subsidy can happen without anyone intending anything in exchange—directly.” “People working
within this system can thus believe—and do believe—that they’re doing nothing wrong by going
along with how things work.” (Lessig, p 235.)
77
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
78
Id. at 686.
79
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 922 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Austin’s logic would authorize
government prohibition of political speech by a category of speakers in the name of equality—a
point that most scholars acknowledge (and many celebrate), but that the dissent denies.”).
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Yet Lessig says that Austin was wrongly decided (Lessig, pp. 240-41) and
he further denies he is arguing to reform campaign financing on egalitarian
grounds: “the corruption of representative democracy is distinct from inequality in
speech or resources within a representative democracy.” (Lessig, p. 362 n. 46.)
This is a smart position to take for an advocate for reform, given that the Roberts
Court has been clear in rejecting egalitarian arguments for campaign finance
regulation. But it is uncertain whether Lessig is being strategic in framing his
constitutional arguments as something other than about equality or if he is blind to
their egalitarian cast.
If “dependence corruption” is not classic (or Type 1) corruption and it is
not (according to Lessig) a concern about political equality, what is it? Despite his
denials, Lessig indeed appears concerned in part with inequality. In addition, he
seems concerned with the possibility that the rent-seeking activity of lobbyists
will undermine the national economic welfare.
This focus on rent seeking is promising. As I have argued elsewhere in
great detail,80 the Supreme Court might uphold some reasonable limits on
lobbyists’ fundraising activities (as well as reasonable anti-revolving door rules)
under the government’s compelling interest in minimizing rent seeking and
promoting national economic welfare. The national security of the United States
could well turn on the ability of Congress to minimize rent seeking, placing the
United States in firmer economic footing in the global economy. Efficient
government in this sense is not a concern about sound administration; it is a
national security imperative because those countries overrun with rent seeking
face national decline compared to other nations.81
Lessig’s ideas on this point, though somewhat inchoate, are in line with
this national economic welfare rationale. According to Lessig, today’s lobbyist is
ethical and well-educated, but is more dangerous than the lobbyist of yesteryear:
“the rent seeking that was hidden and careful before is now open and notorious.”
(Lessig, p. 103.). In the old days, lobbyists gave bribes to get legislative results
they wanted. According to Lessig, when lobbying was corrupt “its effect were
self-limiting” because lobbyists had to be “discreet.”82 Today, Washington is
overrun with lobbyists pursuing policies which undermine the public fisc, and
Congress’s unending search for cash exacerbates the problem. “The single most
salient feature is that [the government] discriminates against all sides to favor
itself….We have created an engine of influence that seeks simply to make those
most connected rich.” (Lessig, p. 7.)
80

Hasen, supra note 5, at 216-26.
Id. at 235-44.
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Lessig is full of examples of this kind of rent-seeking activity which can
harm the national economic welfare. The influence of the pharmaceutical industry
hobbled some aspects of health care reform, and the strength of the financial
industry blocked key provisions of financial reform. Echoing Tea Party
complaints, Lessig says that lobbying and fundraising leads to a larger
government and tax complexity: “Getting a system of simpler taxes is difficult
enough. Getting a system of simpler taxes when Congress has a direct financial
interest in complexity might well be impossible.” “What wins in the market is too
often not what ‘a free market’ would choose but what a market bent by tariffs and
subsidies and endless incumbency protective regulation defaults to. Call that
‘crony capitalism.’” (Lessig, p. 246.)
“Change on the Left gets stopped because strong, powerful private
interests use their leverage to block changes to the status quo. Change on the
Right gets stopped because strong powerful public interests, Congress, work to
block any change that would weaken their fund-raising machine.” (Lessig, p.
211.) The system of campaign funding “radically benefits the status quo—the
status quo for private interests and the status quo of the fund-raising Congress.”
(Lessig, p. 212.) The fundraising system “fuels the very rent seeking that all good
conservatives should oppose.” (Lessig, p. 213)
Further, the personal financial interests of Members of Congress and their
staffers skews outcomes further. Members of Congress have limited salaries and
so rely on devices things like leadership PACs to supplement their lifestyles
(Lessig, pp. 218-219.) Staffers do not get paid much and they therefore count on
going through the revolving door to become lobbyists after time on the Hill.
(Lessig, pp. 221-224.)
In short, the problem is not that lobbyists or members of Congress are
corrupt. It is that the private system of campaign finance with lobbyistarbitrageurs distorts politics and skews political outcomes. That in turn leads
public policy to be out of line with the public’s important interest in efficient
government.
While limits on lobbyist fundraising and post-legislative lobbying
employment could well pass constitutional muster under the national economic
welfare rationale (though a lifetime or very broad ban on legislator/staffer
lobbyist employment seems too draconian), other proposals from Abramoff or
Lessig indeed require constitutional amendments. Term limits for Congress and
repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment could be secured only through
Congressional amendment.
More importantly, a constitutional Amendment appears necessary to enact
Lessig’s tentative proposal to limit corporate independent expenditures as part of
his campaign voucher system. Lessig wrote that the Supreme Court in Citizens
United was wrong in not recognizing “dependence corruption” as a form of
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corruption which could justify campaign spending limits. According to Lessig,
Justice Kennedy, the Justice writing the majority opinion in Citizens United,
incorrectly believes that the Framers would have thought it permissible to make
representatives so dependent upon campaign contributors or that large
independent spending won’t undermine trust in elected officials. (Lessig, p. 24045.)
As much sympathy as I have for Lessig’s critique of Citizens United and
its crabbed view of corruption, the current Supreme Court is exceedingly unlikely
to reverse course and uphold corporate spending limits on anticorruption
grounds.83 In any case, Lessig’s “dependence corruption” does not even qualify as
“corruption” under the Supreme Court precedent. It is either “distortion,” rejected
in Citizens United as an impermissible political equality interest for campaign
regulation, or it is an anti-rent-seeking interest. Although Justice Stevens made
noises in his Citizens United dissent about an anti-rent-seeking/national economic
welfare justification for corporate spending limits, I am extremely skeptical that
the current Supreme Court would uphold limits on independent spending even
assuming it accepted the national economic welfare rationale as an important
governmental interest to justify other campaign finance limits.84
But things are even more dire for Lessig’s voucher plan. Under the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Arizona Free Enterprise Club case,85
Congress could not even implement a voluntary voucher public financing plan
which increased the amount of public financing for candidates facing large
independent spending against them. Effective voucher fundraising, a key part of
Lessig’s reform proposal, stands on very shaky constitutional ground. Lessig
seems to acknowledge the point by devoting the last section of this book to
getting constitutional reform programs enacted.
83
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Implementation Woes. If one accepts the wisdom of some or all of
Lessig’s and Abramoff’s proposed electoral reforms, how would one get from
“here to there?”86 Partisan politics and legislative self-interest provide compelling
reasons why it is very difficult to enact comprehensive lobbying and campaign
finance reform.87 Of course, the chances of attaining constitutional change are
many times smaller than achieving simple legislative reform because of the
extremely high supermajority hurdles to passing constitutional amendments.
Both Abramoff and Lessig recognize that entrenched interests have every
incentive to block reform. (Lessig, pp. 273-75.) Accordingly, both authors suggest
mechanisms to overcome resistance. Abramoff proposes a new reform
organization, modeled after Americans for Tax Reform. “Candidates seeking
federal office should be asked to sign a pledge to clean up government—and that
pledge should include a promise to resign their position should they fail to do
their part.” (Abramoff, p. 276.) The problem with such an approach is that the
there seems little public interest in such process reforms and therefore politicians
would have little to gain electorally by signing and highlighting such a pledge.
Lessig offers a broader menu of strategies, along with assessments of their
likely success. First, he advocates primary challenges from three hundred
“peaceful terrorists” whose sole purpose in running is to enact a reform statute.
He suggests that a single well-liked leading non-politician citizen (Oprah
Winfrey? Warren Buffet?) could run in multiple districts to extract a promise to
support a reform statute from incumbents. The candidates would promise to quit
after enacting the reform. Lessig gives this strategy a five percent chance of
success. (Lessig, pp. 277-79.)
Along similar lines he suggests an unconventional presidential candidate
who credibly signals his exclusive focus will be on fixing corruption problems.
The candidate, someone like former Louisiana governor and now reformist Buddy
Roemer, would pledge to hold government hostage until it passes the statute and
then resign. Lessig gives this strategy a two percent chance. (Lessig, pp. 28589.)
Lessig’s final proposal, which he gives a ten percent chance of success, is
a constitutional convention proposed to enact this kind of reform.88 He further
86
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suggests shadow conventions with the use of deliberative polls and citizen
representatives meeting over the Internet to foster the reform agenda. (Lessig, p.
300-04.) Whether lobbyists could be kept out of the convention process remains
unclear—such a convention would be a natural place for lobbyists to gather and
seek to extend influence.
Lessig admits that it may be irrational to advocate these strategies given
their low chance of success but states he is acting out of love for his country.
(Lessig, p. 306.) While Lessig’s patriotism is admirable, his oddsmaking is
ridiculously optimistic. A ten percent chance of a constitutional convention called
to enact fundamental chances to money in politics? To be called by a Congress
which cannot even agree to pass adequate disclosure laws for campaign finance
regulation?89 To be forced by states which themselves are bitterly divided on
partisan grounds, for a convention with an uncertain power to reopen the
constitution to amendment?
Similarly, a two-percent chance of a successful presidential candidate
making reform his signature issue? Buddy Roemer (praised in Lessig’s book and
later all but endorsed by Lessig90), ran as a Republican presidential candidate in
2012 on just such a platform, and he could not even get enough popular support in
public opinion polls to get included in the Republican candidate debates.91 After
dropping out of the Republican race, he had a clear shot for the Americans Elect
nomination, but his campaign got little support from the right or left and he
dropped out of the race entirely.92 Whether justified or not, the public does not
seem to get excited about process issues such as campaign finance reform or
lobbying reform in deciding whom to support for office.
In Congress, the barrier to reform is not the lack of salience or
understanding of the money-politics connection. Instead, the intense partisan
environment which animates current congressional politics makes any proposal
for widespread reform difficult to enact. Lobbying and campaign finance reform
The Constitutional Case for a Constitutional Convention, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837 (2011).
But this question is beyond the scope of this Review Essay.
89
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are especially difficult because they involve legislative self-interest and more
recently, campaign finance reform has become an issue with a partisan valence.
Aside from two Republican House Members, all Republicans voted against the
major 2010 campaign finance bill, the DISCLOSE Act.93 No Republicans in the
Senate supported it.94 Of the two House Republicans supporting the bill, one,
Mike Castle, ran for Delaware’s open U.S. Senate seat and lost in the Republican
primary to Tea Party candidate Christine O’Donnell.95 The other, Louisianan
Joseph Cao, lost to a Democrat in 2010 after winning a fluke 2008 election
against Democrat William Jefferson, who was indicted on bribery charges which
included $10,000 found by the FBI in his freezer.96
Even in this hyperpartisan atmosphere, it may be possible to enact
moderate lobbying fundraising limits and potentially even a modest extension of
the revolving door limitations—so long as these changes are not accompanied by
broader campaign finance reform. Most government reform legislation follows a
scandal: Watergate (1974’s FECA), Enron (2002’s McCain-Feingold), Abramoff
(2007’s HLOGA). Another scandal could come at any time. But even following
scandal it is hard to see Republicans voting for public financing of congressional
elections—voucher or not—much less supporting a constitutional amendment
reversing Citizens United and once again limiting independent spending in
elections. So far, efforts to do so (again coming from Democrats) are gaining no
traction within Congress.
Despite Lessig’s vision of campaign finance reform as transcending
partisan politics, it has not played out that way, at least so far. There may be great
public fomentation against Citizens United from the left, but it is not also coming
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from the Tea Party,97 and Congressional Republicans seem quite happy with the
new Citizens United regime. If anything, Republicans may see an advantage in the
new Wild West of campaign funding, with its Super PACs and 501(c)(4) and (6)
organizations, allowing unlimited individual and corporate money, much of it
undisclosed, into the political process.98 With campaign reform becoming a
partisan issue, Lessig’s vision of the Tea Party and Occupy coming together for a
package of reforms seems increasingly unrealistic.
Would These Reforms “Fix” Washington? Put aside the question whether
the changes in lobbying rules suggested by Abramoff and Lessig and the
campaign finance changes suggested by Lessig actually could be adopted. If the
changes were adopted, how would they change American politics?
It is an important question, because Lessig’s book, in his attempt to appeal
to Left and Right, oversells how much his proposed changes could affect politics:
the Left and Right will not both see their key conflicting agenda items adopted
(think: a single payer health care system and repeal of President Obama’s health
care plan).
In two earlier articles,99 I made the case that taking lobbyists out of the
fundraising business, extending anti-revolving door laws, and enacting a system
of campaign finance vouchers (with no outside money) would create a system
with less rent-seeking, thereby promoting the national economic welfare.
Lobbyists would retain their role as information gatherers/disseminators and
strategists. They would lose their privileged position in legislative chambers
based not upon the value of the information but instead upon fundraising prowess
and personal connections. Lobbyists would also be less able to set the agenda,
which is currently distorted by moneyed interests.
Campaign finance vouchers also would create a more egalitarian
distribution of political influence, whereby legislative outcomes would be more
likely to reflect majoritarian preferences than the current system. (A voucher
system allowing outside money—as Lessig initially proposed subject to change in
97
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the post-Citizens United world—would be far less likely to promote such
egalitarian goals because voucher money would be just a part of the campaign
money likely to influence legislative outcomes.) Further, under my proposal in
which voters could divide vouchers across candidates, parties, and groups,
financial influence would be a good barometer of intensity of preference and
public support.
The core changes proposed by Abramoff and Lessig would improve the
state of the Nation’s politics considerably and decrease the amount of inefficient
rent seeking. So could some other steps to lessen the influence of money on
politics: we could raise congressional salaries, for example, or enact a line item
veto so that a public-regarding president could strike out special interest deals.
But it is important not to oversell what these changes would do to
American politics. Indeed, both books’ accounts of the problems in Washington
gloss over the role of partisan politics in Washington’s dysfunction. For
Abramoff, partisan dysfunction in Washington is something which a lobbyist
manages to his advantage. For Lessig, party politics and the realignment of the
South with the Republican Party led to modern fundraising practices of
Democrats, in which they tied their fortunes to Wall Street. (Lessig, pp. 94, 97.)100
Lessig otherwise elides over how much of what is wrong with Washington
has to do with politics, not money. He says that money is responsible for the gap
between public opinion and Congressional action, which he terms a problem of
“substantive distortion.” (Lessig, p. 151.) Yet there are many other explanations
for the gap between public preference and Congressional action. While it is true
that Congress spends an inordinate amount of time on credit card fees and this
distortion is likely due to lobbyists, some of Congress’s choices do not seem to
reflect a desire to do the bidding of K Street. Consider the July 2006 House
session, “spent mostly on flag burning, stem-cell research, gay marriage, the
Pledge of Allegiance, religion and gun control.”101 It is partisan politics and an
appeal for votes of the party base, rather than pure desire for more campaign
money, driving a partisan agenda. The public is divided on major policy issues,
especially at the extremes, and Congress’s stalemate in part reflects those
divisions. Campaign finance vouchers would not bring an end to the culture wars
or cause those members of Congress at the extremes of their respective parties to
suddenly become moderate.
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The story of how Congress became such a political body is beyond the
scope of this Review. As told well by Richard Pildes,102 part of the story is one of
partisan realignment which followed the civil rights movement, which has made
the parties become more ideologically coherent and extreme than in the past.
Gerrymandering and the creation of majority-minority districts under the Voting
Rights Act contributed to the rise of stronger, ideological parties.
Part of the rise of polarization has to do with evolution of rules in the
House, which has tended (first under Democrats and then Republicans) to favor
the position of the majority and denigrate the role of the minority. Arcane changes
in committee structure jettisoned seniority as a basis for committee chairmanships
and substituted party allegiance, imposing greater party discipline. Intense
partisanship makes cooperation on legislative issues much more difficult. Civility
has declined markedly in the House, and bipartisan cooperation is exceedingly
rare.103
Legislative sclerosis today also is driven to a great extent by Senate rules.
Under the Senate rules a very small minority (sometimes even a single Senator)
can block legislation supported by the House, President and a majority of the
Senate.104 The filibuster is stronger than ever. The partisanship of the House, and
its lack of civility, has spilled over to partisanship in the Senate. Of course some
of this blockage is due to the role of money, lobbying, and influence. But the
closest connection of money to partisanship is that the parties’ abilities to raise
funds help them to compete further for voters and move to the extremes. Intense
ideological competition between the parties means that there is less cooperation
on legislation which could be in the public interest, out of fear that passing the
legislation will give one party or another an electoral advantage.
Further, especially since the economic downturn, members risk a backlash
from more ideological constituents for voting for bills that the Member believes is
in the public interest. Consider Republicans Members who were attacked by the
Tea Party because of their votes on the auto industry bailout or TARP. Today
Senate Republicans have tacked sharply right as they face Tea Party challenges
and do not want to face the possibility of an insurgent candidacy.105 For example,
102
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look at the record of Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, who did not want to face the
same prospect as his former fellow U.S. Senate Republican colleague Robert
Bennett, who lost to Tea Party candidate Mike Lee. “Mr. Hatch’s voting record
has shifted decidedly rightward. After receiving an 88 percent rating from the
Club for Growth political action committee in 2009, he jumped to 100 percent in
2010 and then 99 percent in 2011, far surpassing his lifetime score of 78
percent.”106 The Senate moderates, such as Senators Snowe and Nelson, have
retired rather than tack to the extremes and face tough primaries.107
Adding to the partisan flames is the newly emergent role of the partisan
media. Beginning with FOX News and now MSNBC on television and the rise of
political blogs on the left and right, the latest arena for competition is social
media. Twitter has become a fierce battleground for political ideas, and it may
make partisan politics even more extreme in coming years.108
There is no reason to believe that lobbying and campaign finance reform
would change the fundamental hyperpolarized dynamic of politics in this country.
True, under a voucher system politicians would be less beholden to narrow,
concentrated interests and more likely to follow the wishes of their constituents.
But constituents are divided too, and voucher money would fuel the hard left and
hard right—not just some compromising middle. Even with vouchers, we would
106
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still be the world of red and blue states, with a hyperpartisan media fanning
political flames. Politicians would still target ideological donors for their voucher
contributions.109 It would not be political nirvana.
The Party/Government Mismatch. A more promising path toward a
broader goal of “fixing Washington” would begin with the fact that there is a
mismatch between the new, strong ideological nature of our political parties and
our old constitutional structure, with its separation of powers and diffusion of
authority. During the most recent period in our history, Democrats controlled the
presidency and the U.S. Senate (subject to the filibuster power of Republicans)
and Republicans controlled the House of Representatives. There was no one party
to blame for policy failures: Democrats pointed to the obstructionism of
Republicans while Republicans blamed the President and Democrats in the
Senate. A single party could not enact a good part of its agenda, which would
allow voters at the next election either to ratify that agenda or vote for a change in
leadership.110
The cleanest solution to the mismatch problem is to move to a
parliamentary-style democracy, in which one party (or a coalition of parties)
controls all the political branches government. But such a solution off the table
because it would radically remake American politics.111
Thus, in a recent book, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American
Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism,112 political
scientists Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann recognize the nature of the
mismatch problem, but do not propose an actual move to parliamentary
democracy, which would require major amendments to the Constitution along the
lines we are unlikely to see in our lifetimes.
The authors also reject a number of reform proposals which they call
“bromides to avoid,” including waiting for the system to correct itself, a third
party a constitutional amendment to balance the budget, term limits, or full public
financing of elections.113 The last rejected proposal reads much like Lessig’s
voucher program.
Instead, Mann and Ornstein advocate voter registration modernization
(making it easier for people to register to vote); compulsory voting (or at least
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efforts to end state restrictions on voting); moving election day from Tuesday to a
weekend; putting congressional redistricting into the hands of citizen
commissions, as was recently done in California; allowing more open primaries
whereby non-party voters can vote for party nominees; the use of alternative
voting systems (such as instant runoff voting), whereby people who vote for less
popular candidates have their votes reallocated to higher vote-getters to produce
majority winners; and (as with Lessig) revamped campaign finance laws to
improve disclosure, take lobbyists out of the fundraising business, and prevent
candidates from coordinating with Super PACs.114
Of course, most of these reforms would never clear the hurdles of our
hyper-partisan atmosphere. More importantly, although many (although not all) of
these reforms are sensible and should be enacted, they hardly seem likely to fix
Washington and end polarization. The basic gist of these reforms is to increase the
number of voters in both primary and general elections. Mann and Ornstein
expect these new voters to be more moderate, and in turn they will choose less
ideological senators and representatives. These new members will then agree to
pass legislation in the spirit of compromise.
But why would these nonvoters-made-voters necessarily be any more
moderate than the voters we already have? The evidence suggests they would not
necessarily be more moderate.115 Further, if parties did not have to worry about
getting out the vote thanks to compulsory voting, they might do a lot more to get
their base excited about their candidates, and politics could get even nastier.
Mann and Ornstein also offer a second set of reforms, including making it
harder to filibuster bills in the Senate, strengthening executive power (so that
voters would hold the president more accountable), and having the media and
others with clout in society shame extreme members of Congress into
moderation.116 Some of these proposals are nonstarters. Republican House
members will wear excoriation by the New York Times editorial board—or
nowadays almost any media outlet—as a badge of honor. While filibuster reform
might be helpful to end gridlock, it would not solve the problem of polarized
parties, separation of powers, and lack of accountability.
In short, the solutions to the major problems of Washington appear
unattainable because they would require a radical restructuring of our government
institutions. Reform which is potentially effective is unlikely to be achievable and
that which is achievable is unlikely to be effective.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Fixing Washington in a fundamental way may take more than the usual
scandal. Change likely will not come until external or internal forces—war,
natural disaster, the fragmentation of one of the two major political parties, or
some other crisis—diminish partisan pressures to create an opening for national
unity or one-party dominance. Until there is consensus not only that Washington
is broken but that the way to fix it is through process improvements including
lobbying and campaign finance reform, we will continue to be stuck in our old
ways.
When that moment for reform comes, the country will have much to learn
from Lessig and Abramoff’s suggested diagnoses of the problems which plague
our national government. But there is only so much work money-and-politicsrelated reforms can do. Alas, many of the problems with a broken Washington
cannot be solved solely through a regulation of political money, and some may
not be solvable at all.

